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Increasing dispersion in the returns to graduate education is found, using 
quantile regression. This trend is related to rising overqualification. We 
distinguish between and validate measures of “Real” and “Formal” 
overqualification, according to whether it is or is not accompanied by 
underutilisation of skill; and using a unique data series in Britain we report the 
trend in overqualification types between 1992 and 2006. The distinction 
between types is relevant because employees in the Real Overqualification 
group experience greater, and more sharply rising, pay penalties than those in 
the Formal Overqualification group. Real Overqualification, but not Formal 
Overqualification, is associated with job dissatisfaction. Formal 
Overqualification has been increasing over time, and in 2006 characterised 
nearly one in four graduates. Real Overqualification has been steady or rising 
only slowly; in 2006 it affected less than one in ten graduates. Conditioning on 
graduates being matched to graduate jobs, it is found that there is no 
significant increase in the dispersion of returns to graduate education. The 
normative implication drawn is that the state should provide regular public 
information on the distribution of the returns to graduate education. 
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The period between 1989 and 1995 saw a sea-change in the proportion of school-
leavers participating in higher education in Britain. As a result, the share of graduates 
in the labour force grew rapidly, the supply of female graduates in particular 
appearing to accelerate after 2002 (Figure 2 on page 2). 
Figure 2: Share of Graduates in the Labour Force. 










Until recently only small signs of departure from the high returns to graduate 
education have been detected, leading researchers to conclude that the new graduates 
were being successfully integrated into the labour market. Nevertheless, it has been 
recognised that the graduate labour market is becoming increasingly heterogeneous 
(Elias and Purcell, 2004), and the picture may be changing quite rapidly. In this paper 
we analyse the returns to graduate education up to 2006, with a focus on their 
dispersion.  
 
2. Increasing Dispersion. 
Instead of assuming that graduate education benefits all students equally, we use 
quantile regression to see how the link between graduate education and pay differs 
across the population. We can rank employees according to the distribution of 
“residuals” attributable to those unobservable factors which affect pay, even though 
by definition we do not know what the unobservable factors are. Then, we can 
estimate the association of graduate education with pay for those who are ranked 
(from lower to higher) at the 10th, 20th, 30th etc percentiles in this distribution. The 
dispersion we discuss in this paper refers to the differences between the findings at the 
different percentiles (or quantiles).   
The quantile regression estimates (Figure 3) show that for both men and women the 
dispersion in the returns to graduate education increased between 1994 and 2006. For 
men, the returns at the 30th and higher quantiles increased significantly between 1994-
6 and 2004-6, while at the 10th quantile the point estimate of the returns decreased by 
a small amount. Over the period the gap between the returns at the 90th and 10th 
quantiles rose from -0.06 to 0.11 log points. For women, the gap rose from 0.17 to 
0.27 log points. Though other changing factors will have contributed, Figures 3a and 
 
3b present a crude “before and after” picture of the effects of the participation surge 
on the dispersion of returns to graduate education. 
The rest of the paper offers an interpretation of this increasing dispersion in terms of 
overqualification, defined as being in a job that does not require a graduate-level 
qualification on entry. 
Figure 3 
Quantile Regression Estimates of Returns to Graduate Education 1994-6 and 2004-6. 





















3. The Growth of Overqualification. 
Using data from a series of Skills Surveys, we find that:  
• In the case of men, overqualification increased steadily over the period, rising 
overall from 21.7% in 1992 to 33.2% in 2006. For women, overqualification 
rose overall by a similar amount, from 23.8% to 32.1%; the increase came 
through a leap in the current decade, following stability in the 1990s. 
• The above rise included a substantial rise in “Formal Overqualification”, 
whereby graduates are overqualified but do not perceive that they are under-
utilising their skills. But there was only a small and insignificant rise in “Real 
Overqualification”, in which overqualified graduates do report underutilising 
their skills at work. 
• Successive cohorts of graduates are found to be more overqualified than 
previous ones. 
 
4. Overqualification matters for individuals.  
• For men, the estimated loss of pay from overqualification compared to being 
in a graduate-level job was already substantial, at 0.28 log points (32%) in 
1992. The penalty remained at similar levels in 1997 and 2001, but rose 
significantly and substantially to 0.40 log points in 2006. For women, the 
penalty rose substantially between 1997 and 2001, and yet more to 2006 when 
it reached 0.45 log points. In short, for both men and women, there has opened 
up a sharp increase in the penalty for being overqualified in the first part of the 
current decade. 
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• In all years Real Overqualification has a substantially greater pay penalty than 
Formal Overqualification. However, both types of overqualification are 
associated with a sharply increasing pay penalty in recent years.  
• There is a substantial negative impact of Real Overqualification on job 
satisfaction. For men the impact increased significantly between 1992 and 
2001. In 2006 22% of the graduates in this category were dissatisfied with 
their job, compared with 7% of matched graduates. For women, Real 
Overqualification has been a substantial source of dissatisfaction according to 
both measures in all years examined, and its impact appears not to have 
changed significantly.  
• For both sexes, there is no significant link between Formal Overqualification 
and job dissatisfaction. Because Formal Overqualification is the largest 
category of overqualification, the aggregate implications of rising 
overqualification for job dissatisfaction are relatively limited, and may have 
been overstated in previous research. 
 
5. Overqualification and Dispersion. 
After controlling for whether graduates are in jobs requiring graduate-level 
qualifications, there is found to be no increase in the dispersion of the returns for men, 
and for women substantially less than is the case with the “average” returns calculated 
without regard to overqualification. We conclude that the increasing dispersion 
between the returns to graduate education at different quantiles of the residual pay 
distribution is strongly, and in the case of men wholly, associated with the increasing 
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The policy implications of increased dispersion and rising overqualification are 
briefly reviewed. First, we confront a possible false conclusion, drawn by some when 
there is discussion of overqualification, that graduate education participation is too 
high. Second, we note that rising dispersion may lead to greater risk, which could 
deter some prospective students from enrolling, thereby affecting the achievements of 
participation targets. Finally, the main normative implication from our findings is that 
efforts should be devoted to improving information flows to prospective students 
about the level and dispersion of returns. We recommend that the returns to graduate 
education be published annually by the Office for National Statistics. 
 iii 
Overqualification, Job Dissatisfaction, and Increasing 
Dispersion in the Returns to Graduate Education. 
 
1. Introduction 
The idea behind this paper is that the concept of “overqualification”, or 
“overeducation”, provides a way of describing, and thereby helping to understand, 
trends in the relationship between education and the labour market.1 Specifically, the 
focus is on the evolution of the returns to graduate-level educational qualifications 
through the period of rapid expansion in tertiary education that occurred in Britain 
during the early 1990s.2  
Despite substantially increased tertiary educational achievements in the British 
workforce, the returns to graduate education over the 1980s and 1990s were always 
high and either increasing or stable (Machin, 2003). The persistence of high returns 
during that time of  rising supply is usually taken, using simple supply and demand 
equilibrium theory, as implying that there must have been equally rapidly rising skills 
demand. The question as to how the economy reacts to increased graduate education 
did not,  however, disappear with such findings. The period between 1989 and 1995 
saw a sea-change in the proportions of school-leavers participating in higher 
education (Figure 1). By the early part of the current decade several years of the now-
larger graduate cohorts had entered the labour force, replacing retiring cohorts with 
very much lower levels of educational achievement. The proportion of graduates in 
the labour force grew rapidly, the supply of female graduates in particular appearing 
to accelerate after 2002 (Figure 2). Three studies find suggestive evidence of 
modestly declining returns in recent years, while demonstrating that the average 
returns to graduate education remain high (Elias and Purcell, 2005; Walker and Zhu, 
2007; and Sloane, 2003).  
Studies of the returns to education typically pay little heed to demand-side factors, 
presumably under the implicit assumption that labour markets are competitive. Yet 
the characteristics of the jobs where graduates are being employed may become 
increasingly relevant for explaining the returns, following the surge in participation. 
According to Elias and Purcell (2004), for example, the graduate labour market is 
becoming increasingly diverse, with graduates and their skills being taken up in new 
and niche occupations (Elias and Purcell, 2004). The pay normally attached to these 
occupations directly affects the returns achieved. One useful way of bringing in the 
demand side is through the concept of overqualification. 
                                                 
1 We treat “overqualification” and “overeducation” as synonymous terms; authors occasionally use the 
term “underemployment” in the same sense, though this term has wider meanings also. 
2 Throughout this paper, we refer to “graduate education”, meaning education leading to a qualification 
at level 4 or above in the English system of qualifications. Level 4 includes both academic 
undergraduate degrees and vocational qualifications at this level. 
 












































Proportion of 18-21 year-olds engaging in at least some HE experience. 
Figure 2: Share of Graduates in the Labour Force. 












Hitherto, studies of overqualification have had little or nothing to add to research on 
the changing returns to education. First aired by Freeman (1976) in respect of the 
United States in the 1970s, “overqualification” is now most widely interpreted as 
referring to a state of disequilibrium, whereby workers possess excess educational 
qualifications relative to those their jobs require. But conceptual ambiguity, and a 
scarcity of consistent time-series data and of longitudinal survey evidence, have 
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inhibited the development of a scientific consensus. A meta-analysis of multiple 
studies found little evidence of any growth in overqualification (Groot and van den 
Brink, 2000), though Felstead et al. (2002) show that there had been a long-term 
growth in Britain. There is little evidence available as to how the costs of 
overqualification may have been changing; a recent exception is the study of 
Chevalier and Lindley (2007), which found that, although after the tertiary expansion 
in Britain in the early 1990s overqualification approximately doubled, the negative 
impact of overqualification on pay remained unaltered when comparing 1996 with 
2002. From this finding they concluded that the labour market was largely able to 
accommodate the expansion of higher education graduates over this period.  
This paper contributes to understanding of the recent graduate labour market in five 
distinct ways, making use of a unique series of survey data. After confirming that the 
returns to graduate education for women were positively correlated with residuals for 
earnings regressions (as shown for both sexes combined in Martins and Pereira, 
2004), our first new contribution is the finding that this dispersion of returns 
substantially increased for both men and women over the period 1994 to 2006. While 
the benefits of graduate education at the top end of the residual wage distribution have 
increased a little, at the bottom end they have sharply decreased. Second, the paper 
reports the long-term trend in overqualification on a consistent basis from 1992 until 
2006. While for the most part the paper will focus on the graduates of tertiary 
education (which we term “graduates” for short), the paper reports trends in 
overqualification both for graduates and for all employees. One reason for examining 
all workers is that graduates of tertiary education, if overeducated, might take up jobs 
that would otherwise be matched to secondary school graduates (A-level equivalent), 
and thereby stimulate overqualification at this lower level also, and so on down the 
education spectrum – a process sometimes unceremoniously termed “bumping down”. 
If so, a comprehensive picture of change requires us to take a look at overqualification 
at all levels. A clear upward trend in overqualification is found, both for graduates and 
for all employees. Moreover, we find that successive cohorts are more overeducated 
than their predecessors.  
Third, we introduce and validate a new method of classifying overqualification, 
according to whether overqualification is accompanied by perceived skills mismatch 
as directly reported by employees. We seek validity for this new classification by 
examining its association with several measures of job skill and related job 
characteristics. The fourth new contribution of the paper is to estimate the personal 
costs of the different types of overqualification in terms of lost pay and job 
dissatisfaction, and to show how these costs have evolved during the period of tertiary 
education expansion. We find that there has been a sharp increase during the current 
decade in the financial costs of being overqualified, but that the dissatisfaction which 
results from overqualification did not significantly deteriorate. Finally, the paper 
illustrates how the trend in overqualification and its personal costs is linked with the 
increasing dispersion in the educational returns for graduates in the last decade. 
After a brief review of relevant previous studies, Section 2 presents quantile 
regression estimates of the returns to graduate education over the recent decade. 
Section 3 considers the relevance of previous studies of overqualification and its 
effects. Section 4 describes the data series, and Section 5 lays out findings pertaining 
to the growth of overqualification and its effects. Section 6 concludes with a 
discussion of the implications for education policy, and includes a recommendation 
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that the Office for National Statistics should publish estimates of the variable returns 
to graduate education on an annual basis. 
 
2. Dispersion in the Returns to Graduate Education 
As the British Government’s “Inquiry” into higher education (Dearing, 1997) 
concluded in 1997, partaking in higher education at that time was an excellent 
personal investment, having an estimated annual private return of between 11% and 
14%; see also Blundell et al. (2000). The returns then were greater for women than for 
men, and had increased significantly since the 1970s and 1980s. Through the 1990s 
the returns to higher academic education continued to rise, though this was balanced 
by some falls in the returns to higher vocational qualifications (Machin, 2003). In-
depth case study work in three sectors during 1999-2000 also supported the view that 
the skills of graduates then being employed in non-traditional graduate jobs were 
being used to a considerable extent, despite evidence of some underemployment and 
limitations to the expansion of graduate skills demand (Mason, 2002). Overall, the 
maintenance through the 1990s of a substantial return to tertiary qualifications is 
taken as testimony to sustained demand in the face of rising supply, at least until the 
end of the decade. The most far-reaching study of the integration of higher education 
and employment up to 2002 drew on a sample cohort of 1995 graduating students re-
interviewed seven years after graduation. Elias and Purcell (2004) identify a set of 
‘new’ and ‘niche’ graduate occupations, outside the traditional professional and 
higher managerial jobs that required degrees for entry.3 They found that these jobs 
tended to require at least some of the skills normally associated with graduates, and 
conclude on balance that the new and niche jobs were generating sufficient demand 
for the skills of the newly enlarged cohort of 1995. Chevalier and Lindley (2007), 
using the same data, find that the penalty for being overeducated did not increase 
compared with an earlier cohort of 1990 graduates. Up to 2002, then, there appears to 
be little or no evidence of declining returns to graduation following the surge in 
participation.4  
However, studies that go beyond 2002 have unearthed suggestive evidence of 
modestly declining wage premia for graduates (Purcell et al., 2005; Walker and Zhu, 
2007; Sloane, 2005). Purcell et al. (2005) call for a more disaggregated analysis, 
given that the graduate labour market is becoming more diverse, a view with which 
we fully agree. One way of capturing diversity uses quantile regression techniques to 
examine the heterogeneous effects of education at different points in the residual 
wage distribution. Martins and Pereira (2004) find that, in several European countries 
(including the UK) during the mid 1990s, returns to education at the upper quantiles 
significantly exceeded those at lower quantiles. This they attribute to any of three 
explanations: overqualification, complementarity between schooling and unobserved 
                                                 
3 These new occupations nevertheless had previously tended to require other post-secondary, often 
vocational, qualifications – an example is nursing. 
4 This optimistic economic picture of the integration of graduates contrasts with some sociological 
research on the consequences of rising higher education participation, which has highlighted the 
contradictory responses of recruiters as they try to identify the most talented graduates and channel 
them into fast-track careers (Brown and Hesketh, 2004). 
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ability, or complementarity between school quality and the residual earnings 
distribution.5  
As Elias and Purcell (2004) show, it is only after about 5 years that almost all 
graduates who are going to will have found their way into graduate jobs. Given also 
the cumulative impact on graduate stocks of the accelerated flows of new graduates in 
the early 1990s, it becomes important to take the analysis of the effects over the long 
term and as up to date as possible. We begin, therefore, by examining both the level 
and the dispersion of returns to graduate education for a period of just over a decade. 
We take 1994 as the starting point, restricting the sample to those over 25, thereby 
including only those who graduated before the surge in higher education. By 2006, all 
those graduating during the surge and for five years after will have entered the 
working population and have had at least five further years to become integrated. 
Figures 3a, 3b, 4a and 4b plot quantile regressions estimates of the returns to graduate 
education in Britain, using consistent data on employees taken from the UK Quarterly 
Labour Force Survey, 5th wave only. The estimates give the log pay increase 
associated with the difference between achieving GCSE Grades A-C or equivalent 
(Level 2) and graduating from tertiary education with at least a college degree or 
professional qualification (Level 4+).6 
 
Figure 3a 
Quantile Regression Estimates of Returns to Graduate Education for Men,  













See Appendix Table A1 for estimates and standard errors7. 
                                                 
5 Another indication of diversity is that both subject matter and degree classification have been found 
to significantly affect the returns to getting a degree (Walker and Zhu, 2007; Bratti et al., 2006). 
6 We chose Level 2 as our comparator in order to give the return associated with staying in education 
after 16, following through and completing tertiary education. The same pattern of findings holds when 
taking no qualifications as the reference. 
7 The estimates are very precisely determined as there are on average 36 thousand males and 38 
thousand females in each 3-year group. 
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Figure 3b 
Quantile Regression Estimates of Returns to Graduate Education for Women, 










See Appendix Table A1 for estimates and standard errors. 
 
Figure 4a  
Quantile Regression and OLS Estimates of Returns to Graduate Education for 
Men. 
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Figure 4b  
Quantile Regression and OLS Estimates of Returns to Graduate Education for 
Women. 
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Figure 3b shows that for women, both at the start and at the end of the period, the 
returns to graduate education are notably greater at higher quantiles. In 1994-1996, for 
example, at the 90th quantile the return on log hourly pay for men was 0.333 (a 39% 
pay premium); this compares with 0.500 at the 90th quantile. This pattern is consistent 
with that reported by Pereira and Martins (2004), applied to the returns to schooling. 
The interpretation to be placed on the monotonically increasing returns across 
quantiles is that there is a complementarity between the effect of education on pay and 
the impact of whatever contributes to the residuals. Typically, in the human capital 
framework, the residuals are seen as capturing unobserved ability; hence it is inferred 
that graduate education must have a larger effect on those with greater unobserved 
ability. It is notable, however, that the same pattern does not apply to men at the start 
of the period (Figure 3a).  
A novel aspect of Figures 3a and 3b is that for both men and women the dispersion in 
the returns to graduate education increased over the period. For men, the returns at the 
30th and higher quantiles increased significantly between 1994-6 and 2004-6, while at 
the 10th quantile the point estimate of the returns decreased by a small amount. Over 
the period the gap between the returns at the 90th and 10th quantiles rose from -0.06 to 
0.11 log points. For women, the gap rose from 0.17 to 0.27 log points. Though other 
changing factors will have contributed, Figures 3a and 3b present a crude “before and 
after” picture of the effects of the participation surge on the dispersion of returns to 
graduate education. 
Figures 4a and 4b present some dynamic details for the same story: they reveal that 
the declining returns at the 10th quartile set in for men at around the end of the 1990s, 
while for women there was a steady slow decline throughout the period. In contrast, 
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the returns at the median and the OLS returns rose for men until the end of the 1990s, 
and remained relatively steady for women throughout the period. The stable OLS 
returns appear to support the proposition that on average the demand for graduates 
relative to GCSE-level school leavers kept pace with the relative supply, and is 
typically used to support the proposition that the extra supplies of graduates are being 
adequately utilised. However, the broader picture given in these Figures indicates that 
the experiences of graduates in the labour market are quite heterogeneous, and 
becoming more so. 
How could this increasing dispersion be rationalised? It might be argued that during 
the surge in participation the changing composition of successive student cohorts will 
have raised the variance of unobserved ability within the graduate labour force. At the 
same time, however, there will have been a changing variance arising from the 
changing composition of Level 2 achievers. If the unobserved ability variance of the 
Level 4+ achievers were to have increased relative to that of the Level 2 achievers, 
then, following the argument that graduate education is complementary with 
unobserved ability, the interpretation would be that those graduates at the lower end 
of the unobserved ability distribution are less able than their counterparts in earlier 
cohorts, and hence gained fewer benefits from graduate education. Simultaneously, it 
might be argued, the demand for average or very able graduates continued to expand 
sufficiently rapidly to maintain or to raise the returns to graduate education for them. 
In short, the pattern of changing returns might still be rationalised within the human 
capital picture of a race between demand and supply. 8 
We are reluctant, however, to rest our understanding of the increasing dispersion on 
such an interpretation, relying as it does on an ad hoc assumption about the 
distribution unobserved ability and a hard-to-verify inference about its interaction 
with graduate education. Moreover, as Atkinson (2007) has argued, the textbook 
supply and demand model may be especially inadequate for explaining the dispersion 
of earnings at the top end of the distribution. Moreover, much of the pay of older 
graduates is attributable to long periods of occupation-specific work experience, 
generating a segmentation among graduates. One would not expect, in response to a 
radical supply shift, to see quick changes in the pay attached to professional and other 
graduate jobs, and this implies that demand side variables will be important in the 
determination of pay. Demand side characteristics are seen as central to the 
determination of pay in the job-queuing model (Thurow, 1972) and in the more 
general framework of job assignment models (Sattinger, 1993), each of which have 
been found to be consistent to some extent with evidence about the effect of 
overqualification on pay. With this alternative interpretation, the returns to graduate 
education may become low for some employees because, as in assignment or queuing 
theories, the pay is largely determined by the jobs. However, the literature on returns 
to education has hitherto tended not to take into account evidence of demand-side 
effects on pay, treating any such effects as short-run perturbations or as orthogonal to 
the treatment effects of education.  
In what follows, we offer an interpretation of the falling returns to graduate education 
at lower quantiles, following the higher education expansion, in terms of 
overqualification: we propose that the returns at the lower end have fallen because 
more people at this end are failing to obtain graduate-level jobs (with associated pay). 
                                                 
8 In addition, since teaching resources per student declined with the surge in participation, the lower 
resources might have interacted with the more variable student abilities. 
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Moreover, since those who become overeducated are not in effective competition with 
graduates who are matched with graduate jobs, the falling returns at the lower end can 
co-exist with stable or rising returns to matched graduates.  
We define overqualification for graduates as the state of being in a job for which the 
required qualification to get the job is below level 4 9. Why might overqualification 
be a useful way of understanding dispersion in the returns to the graduate education? 
Even though the QLFS does not contain information on the qualification requirements 
of jobs, the occupational destinations of graduates at the start and end of our period of 
study are revealing (Figure 5). A crude definition of “graduate jobs”, for this purpose, 
encompasses those in SOCs 1 to 3. Looking at those in the lowest quintile of the 
residual pay distribution (encompassing the 10th quantile where Figures 4a and 4b 
show declining returns), it can be seen that the proportions in that quintile with 
degrees is higher than the proportion of employees in “graduate jobs”. Moreover – 
and this is the significant point – the gap increases over the period: the proportion 
with degrees increases while the proportion in graduate jobs decreases a little (men) 
or is unchanged (women). We have repeated the exercise using two alternative 
typologies of graduate occupation (Elias and Purcell, 2004; Chevalier, 2003), and 
found a similar pattern of growing disparity in the lowest quintile between the 
proportion of graduates and of graduate jobs. 
These observations are consistent with the view that the rising dispersion in the 
returns to graduate education is linked to rising overqualification of graduates. The 
implied measurement of overqualification is, however, questionable. Investigation of 
our interpretation can be carried out more satisfactorily using direct measures of the 
qualification requirements of jobs, which can be used to classify whether workers are 
matched to their jobs. Before turning to our new data from the UK Skills Surveys, 
which permit the direct measurement and classification of overqualification, it will be 
useful first to review relevant findings from earlier empirical studies of 
overqualification.  

















1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
lfsyear
% in Graduate Occupations, Men % in Graduate Occupations, Women
% with Degrees+, Men % with Degrees+, Women
 
                                                 
9 Explicitly this definition refers to ‘getting’ rather than ‘doing’ the job. If an individual had to have a 
degree to get the job, she is not regarded as overeducation even if in her judgement having the degree 
(and the associated skills) is not necessary for doing the job. For evidence on the latter see Felstead et 
al. (2007).  
 9 
 3. Previous Evidence on the Classification, Trend and Impact of 
Overqualification. 
Although there lacks a consensus within economics on the usefulness of the concept 
of overqualification, the literature is held together by certain regular empirical 
relationships which are robust to different measurement strategies. Overqualification 
is normally found to be associated with a notable pay penalty relative to those who are 
matched to a job at their own level: McGuiness (2006) and Sloane (2003) provide 
good overviews. The penalty is typically found to be in the range 10% to 25%, 
depending on data and the definition used. In several, though not all, studies 
overeducated workers are also found to have moderately higher pay than their less-
educated, matched, co-workers. Overqualification is also associated with substantially 
lower job satisfaction and well-being at work (Allen and Van der Velden, 2001; 
Green and McIntosh, 2007; Maynard et al., 2006; Vaisey, 2006; Pollmann-Schult and 
Buchel, 2004); and there is evidence from the Netherlands that overqualification 
contributes to cognitive decline among workers (De Grip et al., in press). There is 
limited evidence about whether overqualification is a permanent state for individual 
workers, but such as there is suggests that, for some, the condition is persistent  
(Dolton and Vignoles, 2000; Rubb, 2003; Frenette, 2004). We also have little 
evidence as to how long-lasting are the costs. Nevertheless, the weight of empirical 
research is sufficient to show that being overqualfi0ed is associated with a significant 
deterioration of worker well-being. All investigated countries have substantial rates of 
both overqualification and undereducation (where job incumbents are less qualified 
than the requirements for new job entrants). Assignment theory (Sattinger, 1993), 
which recognises that there can be more or less close matches between workers and 
firms and is explicitly a theory of disequilibrium, provides a plausible and empirically 
supportable framework for understanding qualifications mismatch (McGuinness, 
2006). The topic remains an active area of research. 
Not all studies conceive of overqualification in the same way. An interpretation 
common in psychology studies encompasses the idea of skill underutilisation, 
whereas economic studies tend to distinguish between skill underutilisation and 
overqualification. As an example of the former, Johnson et al. (2002) conceptualise 
and measure underused talents and work experience and being too highly qualified as 
aspects of the same latent phenomenon. Some recent economics studies, by contrast, 
have made explicit distinction between overqualification and skill underutilisation. 
Green and McIntosh (2007), for example, show that there is a positive but far from 
perfect correlation between the two conditions, which they regard as separate, since 
qualifications and skills are conceptually and practically distinct. Green and McIntosh 
(2007) and Allen and Van der Velden (2001) find that there are significant 
detrimental effects of skill underutilisation on pay and job satisfaction, even after 
conditioning on overqualification. Chevalier (2003) follows a similar path by dividing 
overqualification into two categories: “apparent overeducation” is where a graduate is 
in a non-graduate occupation, but satisfied with the match between qualification and 
job; while “genuine overeducation” is where the graduate in a non-graduate 
occupation is dissatisfied with the match. In other words, Chevalier takes satisfaction 
with the qualification-job match as providing real information about the match. The 
two types have different associations with pay and other outcome variables. For 
example, “genuine overeducation” is found to bring a much larger pay penalty than 
“apparent overeducation”. We agree with Chevalier (2003) that it is useful to 
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distinguish between types of overqualification, according to whether the 
overqualification is associated with a perceived underutilisation of skill. However, we  
think that it is preferable, where the data allow it, to base the decomposition on 
explicit instruments identifying skill underutilisation, rather than indirectly via a 
satisfaction measure. We propose a new simple decomposition in the next section. 
Whichever way overqualification is measured, an important issue for helping to 
understand the evolving balance between supply and demand for highly-educated 
workers is whether the level of overqualification is growing or falling. Unfortunately, 
there is hitherto very little evidence on this issue, because most research has consisted 
of one-off studies of individual cross-sections, using varying measurement strategies. 
While Hartog (2000) finds evidence of some growth in overqualification in the 
Netherlands over 1960-1995, Spain 1985-1990 and Portugal 1982-1992, a meta-
analysis of 25 single country studies (Groot and van den Brink, 2000) found that there 
has in recent decades been no upward trend in overqualification. However, the latter’s 
analysis extended only until the 1990s, was not able to allow for heterogeneous trends 
among countries, and was not decomposed according to type of overqualification as 
suggested in Chevalier’s study (2003). In a subsequent study, Chevalier and Lindley 
(2007) find that there was a doubling in the proportions of both the “apparently” 
overeducated and of the “genuinely” overeducated, between cohorts of workers 
graduating in 1990 and those graduating in 1995 in Britain.  Longer-term evidence for 
Britain using consistent measurement methods show a continual increase in 
overqualification between 1986 and 2001, both for graduates and for all employed 
people (Felstead et al., 2002).  Thus, although we do not know what the recent trend is 
for other countries, the issue of overqualification has been acquiring greater empirical 
significance in Britain. 
Notwithstanding the aforementioned empirical regularities, overqualification studies 
have had only a muted influence within the conventional economics of education. 
Yet, at a time of rapid change it might be expected that disequilibrium should form an 
important part of the explanation(s) offered for education’s changing relationship to 
the economy. It seems far fetched to assume that a market-clearing rate for each 
qualification level is automatically achieved, especially given that young individuals 
are making life-time-oriented education decisions in the face of considerable 
uncertainty. As a disequilibrium concept, overqualification ought therefore to be 
considered a potentially useful tool in helping to understand the impact of large shifts 
in the flow of highly educated workers, such as that which began in Britain in 1989.  
In light of this evidence and of the previous discussion, we therefore address the 
following issues: 
i. What is the continuing trend in the prevalence of overqualified employees in 
Britain, up to the middle of the current decade, following the expansion in the 
1990s of the flow of new graduates onto the labour market? Do different types 
of overqualification change in different ways from others?  
ii. Relatedly, does the experience of overqualification for each cohort of 
graduates diminish as each cohort grows older, and are successive cohorts 
becoming more or less overqualified? 
iii. How have the costs of overqualification – in terms of lost pay or greater job 
dissatisfaction – changed in the recent decade, following the expansion of 
higher education? 
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iv. Are the changing extent and effects of overqualification linked to the 
increasing dispersion in the returns to graduate education identified in Section 
2? 
 
4. Data Sources and the Measurement of Types of Qualification Mismatch. 
The key requirement for addressing these questions is data suitable for measuring 
overqualification in a consistent way over time and covering recent years after the 
accelerated influx of graduates onto the British labour market, as well as a means of 
disaggregating overqualification according to whether it is accompanied by skills 
underutilisation, and adequate measures of outcomes (hourly pay, job satisfaction). 
We use data drawn from the 2006 Skills Survey, along with three earlier surveys. To 
facilitate trend analyses, the 2006 Skills Survey was designed to ensure comparability 
with the earlier surveys, and to this end used identical instruments for the 
measurement of the qualification requirements of jobs, and other relevant variables. 
The 2006 survey covered employed people aged 20 to 65 across the UK, with an 
achieved sample of 7,787 individuals. So as to compare with earlier surveys, we 
restrict the sample to those aged no more than 60, living in England, Wales or 
Scotland (south of the Caledonian Canal). We also limit the sample to employees 
aged 25 and over, assuming that by 25 the very large majority of people will have 
finished full-time education. Weights were computed to take into account the 
differential probabilities of sample selection according to the number of dwelling 
units at each issued address, the number of eligible interview respondents (Kish 
weight), and the oversampling of certain regions. The distribution of the achieved 
sample was compared with the Quarterly Labour Force Survey, according to sex, age, 
ethnicity, working time, occupation, industry and qualification level, and found to be 
acceptably close. However, sex and age weights were added to the sample weights in 
order to correct for a slight under-representation in the achieved sample of men and 
those in their twenties. With this correction, the result is a high quality, randomly 
drawn, data set, with an achieved representative sample for Britain of 5,224 
employees. Details are provided in Felstead et al. (2007).  
The earlier data sources, each containing nationally representative samples drawn 
with similar random probability methods, were Employment in Britain in 1992, the 
1997 Skills Survey and the 2001 Skills Survey: for details see, respectively: Gallie et 
al. (1998), Ashton et al. (1999) and Felstead et al. (2002). In addition to meeting our 
requirements for analysis of change over time, the surveys furnish measures of the 
skills used in jobs, which can serve to test the validity of the overqualification 
typology adopted. 
Measurement of job qualification requirements has been undertaken in a variety of 
ways in earlier studies, usually driven by data availability. However, the two preferred 
methods use either expert assessment or the job-holder’s assessment. We use the latter 
method. Respondents were asked: “If they were applying today, what qualifications, if 
any, would someone need to get the type of job you have now?”. From the range of 
options given, we derived the highest qualification required, classified into four 
academic/NVQ-equivalent levels.  
In line with convention we define an individual to be overqualified (underqualified) if 
her own qualifications (Q) exceed (are less than) her job’s required qualifications 
(RQ): 
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Overqualification dummy: OQ = 1 if RQi < Qi, OQ = 0 if RQi >= Qi   (1) 
Underqualification dummy: UQ = 1 if RQi > Qi, UQ = 0 if RQi <= Qi   (2) 
where index i takes on values 0 to 4. 
Skill utilisation is measured in our data through individuals’ subjective reports of their 
job. In one question, individuals were asked: “How much of your past experience, 
skill and abilities can you make use of in your present job?”, with answers against a 
scale: “very little”/ “a little”/ “quite a lot”/ “almost all”. This question was asked in 
identical fashion in 1992, 1997 and 2006. Those who answered in either of the first 
two scale points were taken to be underutilising their skills. We thereby generated a 
0/1 dummy variable for overskilled (OS). Taken over the pooled data, the correlation 
coefficient between OS and OQ is 0.163 (p=0.000), which confirms that as expected 
the association between overskilling and overqualification is significant but loose.  
In line with the earlier discussion, we decompose the overqualification state into two 
categories, according to whether the overqualification is associated with 
underutilisation of skills. In one category, which we shall term “Real 
Overqualification”, the individual is both overqualified and experiencing skill 
utilisation; while in the other, which we term “Formal Overqualification”, the 
individual is overqualified as defined in (1) but experiences full skill utilisation.10 
Real Overqualification occurs if and only if OQ = 1 and OS = 1, while Formal 
Overqualification occurs if and only if OQ = 1 and OS = 0. This leaves an additional 
category of those for whom OQ = 0 yet OS = 1, which we term “Skills 
Underutilised”, and the remaining category comprises those who are in none of the 
other three, termed simply “Matched”. 
When experiences are reported with single items there is always a risk of some error 
or bias, so it is preferable where possible to utilise multiple items for measurement. In 
a second question aimed at the same concept, respondents were asked how much they 
agreed with the statement: “In my current job I have enough opportunity to use the 
knowledge and skills that I have”. They were given a 4-point agreement scale. Those 
who answered “disagree” or “strongly disagree” with this statement were taken to be 
underutilising their skill. The responses were related as expected with those on the 
“how much” scale in the first question (the correlation coefficient is 0.30, p = 0.00). 
Unfortunately, the second question was asked only in 2001 and 2006, so to cover the 
period it is not possible to combine the indices. Instead, we present some data using 
this second question as a robustness check on the trends revealed by the first question. 
Before proceeding to discuss findings about the trends in overqualification and in its 
component parts, we present first some descriptive statistics, in order to test the  
validity of the classification of overqualification adopted. Taking graduates as a 
group, we hypothesised that those classified as matched to graduate-level jobs would 
be in higher skilled jobs than those in any of the overqualification categories. 
Moreover, we expected that those in the Real Overqualification category would be in 
the least skilled jobs. To see whether this is indeed the case we pool the data from 
1992, 2001 and 2006, and examine various job-skill measures for each category -- see 
Table 1.  
                                                 
10 We utilise the “formal/real” duality in contrast to Chevalier’s “apparent/genuine” duality, in part to 
flag up our distinct typology but also because the term “apparent” seems almost to suggest the absence 
of an effect a priori, an impression which we think it preferable to avoid here. 
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As expected, graduates in the Real Overqualification category are working in jobs 
with low skill demands according to all of several measures. The first two columns 
show the estimated time taken to “learn to do the job well”, where the presumption in 
the measure is that jobs which can be picked up in less than a month from the time 
when first started are unskilled. As can be seen, 38.0% of jobs in the Real 
Overqualification group are low-skilled by this measure, compared with just 6.7% in 
matched jobs. The third column gives the proportion of jobs where incumbents are 
required continually to learn new things – only 19.4% in the Real Overqualification 
group, compared to 50.0% of those in matched jobs. Columns 4 and 5 present direct 
measures of job skill use, utilising the measures reported in Felstead et al. (2007). 
Column 4 is the proportion of jobs requiring the use of “influence skills” – involving 
persuading and influencing people, teaching and instructing them, and other forms of 
high-level communication. Column 5 is the proportion of jobs requiring computer use 
at high levels of sophistication. Both these skills are highly rewarded in the labour 
market (Dickerson and Green, 2004), and in both cases the Real Overqualification 
group are in jobs that are less skill-demanding than those of all other groups. Finally, 
Column 6 gives the proportion of graduates in “graduate jobs” as defined for Figures 
5a and 5b: only 33.5% are in the top three occupational groups, compared with 89.5% 
of the matched group.  
The next lowest skills are for those in the Formal Overqualification group: those 
formally requiring less than graduate-level qualifications but not perceiving 
themselves to be under-utilising their skills. These are followed by the group that are 
Qualification Matched but Skills Underutilised. The highest skilled jobs, according to 
all these summary measures, are found for those in the Matched group. With only a 
few minor exceptions, moreover, the same ranking of job-skills is found for the 
classification deployed using the second definition of skill underutilisation (though 
this time with just the 2001 and 2006 data).  
A further point of internal validation may be obtained by examining whether graduate 
respondents feel that they have achieved in work what they expected. We 
hypothesised that those matched to jobs would be more likely to have felt that they 
achieved their expectations, than those who were overqualified. Respondents were 
directly asked how well they thought they had done in their working lives, compared 
to their expectations. They could respond against a five point scale. Among those 
graduates in the Real Overqualification group (first definition), 42.4% answered at 
the bottom two points of the scale, namely that they had done “a bit less well” or 
“much less well” than expected; this compares with 17.3% of those who were 
matched to their jobs and utilising their skills.  
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Table 1 Validation of Decomposition of Overqualification and Matched Status of 
Graduates by Whether Skills are Underutilised 

































Overqualification  8.0 38.0 19.5 5.0 11.3 30.9 
Formal 
Overqualification  26.3 13.1 36.7 25.7 25.0 58.0 
Qualification 
Matched and Skills 
Underutilised 
30.5 7.1 43.9 26.2 34.2 79.4 
Qualification 
Matched and Skill 
Utilised 
43.9 6.7 49.9 50.1 30.8 89.7 
 


































Overqualification  11.5 43.0 16.6 10.7 18.3 29.0 
Formal  
Overqualification  25.2 11.4 37.5 23.9 27.6 58.7 
Qualification 
Matched and Skills 
Underutilised 
34.2 11.7 37.9 38.9 32.3 89.9 
QualificationMatc
hed and Skill 
Utilised 
44.4 5.6 52.6 49.4 40.2 89.1 
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Table 2. Prevalence of Graduate Overqualification by Gender, Presence of 
Dependent Children, Age, and Education Characteristics 
Row percentages for each group, summing to 100%. 
 













Men 8.6 20.6 5.7 65.1 
Women 7.5 20.3 4.9 67.3 
Women Part-timers 10.8 24.7 4.6 59.9 
Dependent Children Under 
16 
    
Yes 8.5 20.3 4.1 67.0 
No 8.1 22.9 5.9 63.2 
Maths Level **     
Below A-Level  9.4 24.9 4.7 61.1 
A-Level or above 5.3 13.7 6.4 74.6 
University Type     
Oxbridge 0.0 10.6 0.4 89.0 
Pre-1992 University 8.9 14.3 6.0 70.9 
Other UK 8.8 21.4 4.7 65.2 
Non-UK 14.8 21.4 3.7 60.1 
Degree Grade*     
Below Upper Second 12.8 20.0 3.5 63.7 
Upper Second or First 9.3 15.6 4.6 70.4 
Degree Subject**     
Maths and Sciences 6.7 12.8 6.1 74.4 
English and Humanities 12.0 18.4 2.1 67.5 
Business, Management, 
Economics 8.4 17.8 5.8 68.1 
Vocational: including law, 
medicine, nursing, education 3.3 6.7 6.6 83.4 
Social Sciences 7.9 21.2 5.7 65.2 
Art and Design 24.5 33.6 3.2 38.7 
*2006 data only; ** pooled 2001 and 2006 data; otherwise, pooled 1992, 2001 and 
2006 data.  
The university and subject data are only available for degree graduates. 
 
If the classification of overqualification is plausible, who are the people that fall in 
these categories? Table 2 also pools data, and presents statistics describing how 
graduate overqualification groups are distributed by gender and by educational 
achievement. Overqualification is particularly high among female part-time 
employees, echoing recent research on trends in part-time work (Connolly and 
Gregory, 2008). As previous studies have found, overqualification is also found to be 
less prevalent for graduates with higher personal skills indicators. Thus, Real and 
Formal Overqualification are each less prevalent when respondents had gained maths 
at A level or above, or had achieved an upper second or better class of degree, or had 
graduated from Oxford or Cambridge. Formal overqualification is also less prevalent 
for those graduating from pre-1992 universities than for those graduating from other 
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universities. Overqualification is also especially high, as other studies have found, for 
graduates of Art and Design, and especially low for those graduating in professional 
vocational subjects.  
Taken together, these tables imply that the categorisation of overqualification which 
we suggest, based on either of the additional questions addressing underutilisation of 
skills, is plausible, given the other available summary information about the nature of 
the job, as shown in Table 1, or about the person’s educational achievements as 
shown in Table 2. We therefore proceed in the next Section to examine the trends in 
the prevalence and effects of overqualification. 
Other variables are standard, and are delineated in the analysis that follows. A key 
outcome is pay, and to avoid outlier-induced biases we excluded the top and bottom 




(i) The Growth of Overqualification. 
As noted above, there is hitherto limited evidence available as to the trend in 
overqualification in Britain following the expansion of higher education. Table 3 
presents findings about the changing prevalence of graduate overqualification in 
Britain between 1992 and 2006. In the case of men, overqualification increased 
steadily over the period, rising overall from 21.7% in 1992 to 33.2% in 2006. For 
women, overqualification rose overall by a similar amount, from 23.8% to 32.1%; the 
increase came through a leap in the current decade, following stability in the 1990s. 
These are substantial rises, which coincided with the steep increase in the proportion 
of graduates in the labour market.  
In the third row of each panel of Table 3 is recorded the proportion of graduates 
experience underutilisation of skills. According to the first definition, there is not 
much change in underutilisation over the whole 1992 to 2006 period, either for men 
or for women; according to the second definition, there is no significant change for 
men, and only a small rise for women between 2001 and 2006. Taken together, it 
appears that, even though overqualification and overskilling are correlated, their 
trends are different. The rising extent of overqualification has not been accompanied 
by a rising sense of skill underutilisation.  
This finding leads to the hypothesis that, even though more graduates are finding 
themselves in jobs where their qualifications are not formally required, these same 
graduates nonetheless are able to make use of their skills. To examine the trend 
further, we utilise the decomposition of overqualification delineated in the previous 
section. Table 3 confirms that it is Formal Overqualification that has increased 
sharply for both men and women, especially over 2001-6 in the case of women. This 
category now represents just under a quarter of graduates. Real Overqualification is a 
less numerous category, with fewer than a tenth of graduates falling into it. There has 
been an increase in the point estimate of its prevalence, according to either definition, 
for both genders; however, the increase is quite small and not statistically significant. 
Overeducated graduates, in taking up jobs at lower skill levels, may restrict the 
availability of jobs for those educated at lower levels, especially if employers 
preferentially employ graduates in lower-level jobs. “Bumping down” thus would 
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lead to an increase in overqualification for lower educational groups, which can add to  
other tendencies towards mismatch for lower-level jobs. Table 4 records the overall 
experience of overqualification across all employees, and reveals a broadly similar 
pattern of change to that observed for graduates. Overqualification is rising for both 
men and women, and has now reached 37% of employees. Overskilling, by contrast, 
is not rising for men; and for women even fell in the 1990-2001 period. Decomposing 
overqualification into formal and real overqualification, for both genders there is a big 
rise in formal overqualification, but no obvious trend in real overqualification. For all 
employees, underqualification fell by a modest amount for men, while remaining 




Table 3  Education/Job Matching for Graduates, 1986-2006 
(% of graduate employees) 
 
a) Men 
 1992 1997 2001 2006 
Matched 
 78.3 77 73 66.8 
Overqualified 
 21.7 23 27 33.2 
Overskilled 1 
 15.4 - 12.8 15.4 
Overskilled 2 
 - - 16.5 16.6 
Decompositions of Overqualified 
Real  
Overqualification 1 7.5 - 7.2 9.9 
Formal  
Overqualification 1 14 - 19.8 23.4 
Real  
Overqualification 2 - - 7.3 9.7 
Formal  




 1992 1997 2001 2006 
Matched 
 76.2 74.8 76.6 68 
Overqualified 
 23.8 25.2 23.4 32.1 
Overskilled 1 
 12.2 - 12.0 12.7 
Overskilled 2 
 - - 15.4 17.6 
Decompositions of Overqualified 
Real  
Overqualification 1 7.2 - 5.9 8.4 
Formal  
Overqualification 1 16.1 - 17.5 23.7 
Real  
Overqualification 2 - - 7.5 10.0 
Formal  




Table 4  Education/Job Matching for All Employees, 1986-2006 
(% of employees) 
a) Men 
 1992 1997 2001 2006 
Matched 
 55.1 53.7 50.7 48.1 
Overqualified 
 26.4 26.5 32.5 37.3 
Underqualified 
 18.7 19.8 16.8 14.6 
Overskilled 1 
 25.7  21.7 24.1 
Overskilled 2 
   16.7 16.1 
Decompositions of Overqualified 
Real  
Overqualification 1 9.8  11.3 12.4 
Formal  
Overqualification 1 16.6  21.2 25.0 
Real  
Overqualification 2   8.0 9.1 
Formal  




 1992 1997 2001 2006 
Matched 
 60.0 54.3 52.8 49.2 
Overqualified 
 28.4 31.1 34.0 37.7 
Underqualified 
 11.6 14.6 13.2 13.1 
Overskilled 1 
 30.5  23.7 22.9 
Overskilled 2 
   18.9 16.5 
Decompositions of Overqualified 
Real  
Overqualification 1 12.8  10.9 11.7 
Formal  
Overqualification 1 15.5  23.1 26.0 
Real  
Overqualification 2   9.4 9.6 
Formal  




(ii) Overqualification of Successive Age Cohorts. 
We complete this description of the changing extent of overqualification by 
examining overqualification in successive cohorts. As can be seen in Table 5,  for 
both men and women the 25-38 year old cohort in 2006 was more overqualified than 
its earlier counterpart in 1992 (for men, 34.4% compared with 24.3%; for women, 
35.2% compared with 19.7%); similarly, for men the 2006 39-52 cohort was more 
overqualified than its 1992 counterpart. 
Overqualification can change within each cohort as it ages for a number of reasons, 
which could only be explored fully with longitudinal data. Overqualification would 
fall if overqualified workers switch within or between employers  to higher skill jobs, 
or alter the content of jobs within existing job-titles. There could also be a selection 
effect with overeducated workers quitting more readily than matched workers. If, on 
the other hand, overeducated workers were less ready to quit, or if cohorts gain 
qualifications through lifelong learning faster than they are able to find upgraded 
jobs, the prevalence of overqualification can rise within any cohort as it gets older. In 
the event, the male cohort that was aged 25-38 in 1992 retained approximately the 
same prevalence of overqualification late in life in 2006, while the same-aged female 
cohort became more overeducated. In contrast, the male cohort that was 39-52 in 
1992 became much more overqualified, while  the female cohort experienced little 
change. We conclude that, whatever the cause, overqualification has persisted within 
cohorts as they grow older.  
 
 
Table 5 Overqualification Within Graduate Cohorts 
 
Cohort Cohort age in: Men Women 
 1992   |  2006 1992 2006 1992 2006 
1 11-24 | 25-38 na 34.4 na 35.2 
2 25-38 | 39-52 24.3 25.6 19.7 27.9 
3 39-52 | 53-66* 16.9 46.7 27.3 28.4 
 
(iii) The Costs of Overqualification for Graduates. 
We now estimate the costs of overqualification in two dimensions, pay and job 
satisfaction. As noted above, earlier studies have established that lower pay and less 
job satisfaction is associated with overqualification, while overqualified workers are 
also found commonly to be better paid than their matched co-workers at the same 
education level. The two issues for examination here are whether the costs of 
overqualification have been changing, and whether the costs of the two types of 
overqualification differ.  
Table 6 presents estimates of the penalty associated with overqualification for 
graduates, separately for men and women, expressed as reductions in the log of 
hourly pay, extracted from conventional earnings functions in successive years. For 
brevity, the Table shows only the coefficients of interest, since the other control 
variables are standard and follow the usual pattern. We have not corrected for 
possible endogeneity bias on the overqualification dummy coefficient;  the estimates 
show the conditional association of overqualification with a pay penalty, rather than a 
treatment effect. 
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In the first panel the penalty for being overqualified in any way is shown. For men, 
the estimated penalty was already substantial, at 0.28 log points (32%) in 1992. The 
penalty remained at similar levels in 1997 and 2001, but rose significantly and 
substantially to 0.40 log points in 2006. For women, the penalty rose substantially 
between 1997 and 2001, and yet more to 2006 when it reached 0.45 log points. In 
short, for both men and women, there has opened up a sharp increase in the penalty 
for being overqualified in the first part of the current decade. This finding differs 
from that of Chevalier and Lindley (2007), but their analysis extends only until 2002, 
since when the graduate labour supply has increased substantially. In our results, the 
increase in the pay penalty was not yet evident in 2001 for men.  
Given the differential rates at which the different categories of overqualified workers 
have expanded in numbers, as shown above, it is also of interest to examine whether 
there are different penalties for the two categories. These results are shown in the 
bottom panels of each part of Table 6.  
For both men and women, the penalty associated with overqualification is 
substantially greater for those in the Real Overqualification category than for those in 
the Formal Overqualification category. This finding is consistent with that of 
Chevalier (2003), albeit on the basis of our different method of decomposition. For 
men, the point estimate of the penalty associated with Real Overqualification 
increased between 1992 and 2001, though because the numbers are small the 
precision is reduced and the rise was not statistically significant. Between 2001 and 
2006, however, the penalty rose significantly from 0.49 to 0.62 log points. The 
penalty for Formal Overqualification also rose, reaching 0.32 log points in 2006, but 
here the rise is clearly just in the current decade. For women, the penalty associated 
with Real Overqualification was largely unchanged between 1992 and 2001 but 
jumped to 0.64 log points in 2006; while the penalty for Formal Overqualification 
rose during the 1992-2001 period, and hardly at all in the 2001-2006 interval. 
In short, both categories of overqualification show evidence of being associated with 
a sharply increasing pay penalty in the most recent years – arguably the time when 
one might expect the pressure of increasing graduate labour supply to have an effect 
on graduates in the more flexible jobs. At the same time, it is much worse to be in a 
job with both too high educational qualifications and underutilisation of skills and 
abilities, than just to be overqualified and not overskilled. 
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Table 6 Estimated Conditional Association of Overqualification with Log Hourly 
Pay. 
a) Men 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1992 1997 2001 2006 
1. Estimates including graduate 
overqualification (see below for 
other variables included) 
   
Overqualified -0.276 -0.330 -0.246 -0.404 
 (0.050) (0.061) (0.050) (0.048) 
Observations 1172 888 1657 2126 
R-squared 0.43 0.43 0.40 0.45 
2. Estimates including types of 
mismatch (see below for other 
variables included) 
    
Real overqualification -0.401 - -0.488 -0.619 
 (0.085) - (0.081) (0.099) 
Formal overqualification -0.240 - -0.175 -0.322 
 (0.055) - (0.055) (0.042) 
Qualification Matched but Skills 
Underutilised 
-0.229 - -0.189 -0.046 
 (0.069) - (0.092) (0.056) 
Observations 1163 - 1657 2125 
R-squared 0.44 - 0.41 0.46 
 
b) Women 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 1992 1997 2001 2006 
1. Estimates including graduate 
overqualification (see below for 
other variables included) 
   
Overqualified -0.316 -0.257 -0.392 -0.454 
 (0.048) (0.063) (0.040) (0.033) 
Observations 1144 886 1643 2308 
R-squared 0.49 0.58 0.57 0.55 
2. Estimates including types of 
mismatch (see below for other 
variables included) 
    
Real overqualification -0.441 - -0.430 -0.642 
 (0.048) - (0.060) (0.056) 
Formal overqualification -0.250 - -0.386 -0.407 
 (0.062) - (0.047) (0.033) 
Qualification Matched but Skills 
Underutilised 
0.109 - -0.076 -0.196 
 (0.058) - (0.088) (0.058) 
Observations 1134  1640 2306 
R-squared 0.49  0.57 0.56 
 
All estimates derive from a conventional earnings function, augmented by dummy variables for 
overqualification. The dependent variable is log hourly pay, and regressors also include lower 
educational levels and matches to jobs, a quadratic in work experience, and industry and regional 
dummies; the omitted category is “graduate qualification matched to a job requiring a graduate 






Table 7.  The Conditional Association between Overqualification Status and Job 
Satisfaction for Graduates 
 1992 2006 
A. Conditional Effect of 
Overqualification Status on Job 
Satisfaction (Compound Measure) 
  
Real Overqualification    
Men -0.278 (0.141)** -0.612 (0.111)*** 
Women -0.565 (0.204)*** -0.450 (0.149)*** 
Formal Overqualification    
Men -0.282 (0.142)*** -0.126 (0.078) 
Women -0.046 (0.129) -0.168 (0.074)** 
Matched and Underutilised   
Men -0.129 (0.143) -0.216 (0.176) 
Women -0.423 (0.257)* -0.247 (0.119)** 
Notes: Reference category: matched graduates. *, ** or *** indicate that the coefficient estimates 
differ significantly from the reference category (matched graduates) at the 1, 5 or 10% level 
 
B. Predicted Overall Job 
Dissatisfaction of Gra-

















































95% confidence intervals are shown in parentheses. 
Note: The figures in both panels derive from estimations that are conditional on the education level and 
match variables, and also include controls for work experience (quadratic), public sector, establishment 
size, self-employment status, industry and region; the estimations are OLS regressions in the case of 
the compound measure of job satisfaction, and ordinal logits in the case of the overall job satisfaction 
measure. Full estimation results available on request. 
The compound job satisfaction scale is computed as the average of the linearised scales of job 
satisfaction across 15 domains: covering promotion prospects, pay, relations with boss, job security, 
opportunity to use abilities, ability to use initiative, management ability, hours of work, fringe benefits, 
the work itself, the amount of work, work variety, training, friendliness of colleagues, communications 
between management and employees. The Cronbach’s Alpha coefficient for this scale is 0.887 for the 
1992 sample and 0.898 for the 2006 sample.  
The figures in Panel B are the mean predicted probabilities that the worker is either “fairly 
dissatisfied”, “very dissatisfied” or “completely dissatisfied”, using the overall job satisfaction 
measure. Estimates are obtained using ordinal logit, with identical controls to those used in Panel A. 
 
 
Earlier studies have established that overqualification is also associated with lower 
levels of job satisfaction. Here, we are able to examine whether the consequences for 
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job disatisfaction are more severe, as expected, for Real Overqualification, than for 
Formal Overqualification. Moreover, given that Formal Overqualification has become 
more prevalent, and that the consequences for hourly pay of overqualification are 
greater, we examine whether also the costs of each overqualification type have 
changed.  
Our findings are shown in Table 7. We utilise two alternative measures of job 
satisfaction. First we derive a compound measure of job satisfaction, averaging 
responses on a 7-point scale to 14 items covering different domains, including both 
intrinsic aspects of the work and extrinsic aspects such as pay. We regress the 
compound measure against conventional variables used in job satisfaction equations, 
and include our measures of overqualification. The coefficient estimates for the 
different types of overqualification are shown in Panel A. Second, we utilise 
responses (same 7-point scale) on a single summary question about overall job 
satisfaction: “All in all, how satisfied are you with your job?”. We estimate the 
determinants of overall job satisfaction using an ordinal logit specification, and use 
the estimates to predict the conditional proportions of dissatisfied workers. 
Table 7 reveals that, for men, according to both measures (compound and overall), 
there is a substantial negative impact of Real Overqualification on job satisfaction; the 
impact increased significantly between 1992 and 2001, and in 2006, more than one in 
5 graduates (22%) in this category are dissatisfied with their job, compared with about 
1 in 14 (7%) of matched graduates. Formal Overqualification also brings some 
dissatisfaction according to the compound measure for 1992, compared with matched 
workers; but the difference becomes small and insignificant in 2006, and is also 
insignificant in its effect on the overall job satisfaction measure. 
For women, Real Overqualification has been a substantial source of dissatisfaction 
according to both measures in all years examined, and its impact appears not to have 
changed significantly. Most strikingly, Formal Overqualification is not a significant 
source of dissatisfaction for women.  
Taken together, the conclusion is that overqualification is not a problem for job 
satisfaction in itself if it is not accompanied by underutilisation of skill; but where it is 
accompanied by underutilisation of skills, overqualification is a substantive issue. For 
women, Real Overqualification, the category which generates dissatisfaction, is not 
expanding, and the dissatisfaction is no worse than before. For men the loss of job 
satisfaction is becoming more of a concern. Nevertheless this finding should be 
placed in perspective. Being in the Real Overqualification category is associated with 
an increase of 16 percentage points in the probability of being dissatisfied with one’s 
job, but only 9.2% of male graduates are in this category -- this equates approximately 
to 150,000 dissatisfied graduates above a hypothetical alternative where all such 
graduates were matched to their jobs. 
 
 
(iv) Overqualification and the Dispersion in the Returns to Graduate Education. 
We return now to the issue of the increasing dispersion in the returns to graduate 
education, our first finding reported above. Is that rising dispersion associated with 
the increasing incidence and cost of overqualification? This question can be assessed 
using the Skills Survey series with its consistent data on overqualification and wage 
outcomes over time, by estimating trends in the returns conditional on graduates being 
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matched to graduate jobs. If the rising dispersion that appeared in recent years is 
associated with rising overqualification, as has been suggested, then as long as 
graduates are being matched with graduate jobs, one should expect to find that the 
difference between the estimated effects of graduate education at the top and bottom 
ends of the residual pay distribution remains constant (or as a weaker hypothesis 
changes by much less). 
We investigate this question in a straightforward manner, which is displayed in 
Figures 6a and 6b. The “Average” returns are presented for each of the 10th, 50th and 
90th quantiles, as obtained from quantile regressions similar to those used with the 
QLFS data and portrayed in Figures 4a and 4b. Compared with Figures 4a and 4b the 
precision of estimates is lower (standard errors are reported in Appendix Table A2), 
owing to there being fewer observations. The Figures also show the “Matched” 
returns, which condition on being matched to a job requiring graduate-level 
qualifications. 
As can be seen, the “Average” returns fan out in later years, giving the same pattern 
with the Skills Survey data as obtained in the QLFS data with returns at the 10th 
quantile falling. The 2006 difference between the 90th and 10th quantile is 0.263 log 
points for men, and 0.448 log points for women. For women the increased dispersion 
appears to have begun between 1997 and 2001, and intensified between 2001 and 
2006, while for men the increased dispersion is evident only between 2001 and 2006.  
In contrast, the “Matched”  returns remain closer together over the period, and in 
particular are significantly closer together in 2006 than are the average returns. The 
difference between the 90th and 10th quantiles is just 0.053 log points for men, and 
0.241 log points for women. For both sexes these estimates are significantly below 
those for the “Average” returns, and for men the estimate is insignificantly different 
from zero. For women, the dispersion of the “Matched” returns increased significantly 
less since 1992 than did the dispersion of the “Average” returns. 
We conclude that the increasing dispersion between the returns to graduate education 
at different quantiles of the residual pay distribution is strongly, and in the case of 
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Several new findings have been reported about the returns to graduate education, 
using both the QLFS and a unique data series with consistent data on 
overqualification over a number of years, we have added substantially to what is 
known about overqualification and its effects. The surveys apply to representative 
samples of British employees aged 20 to 60. Over a fourteen-year period from 1992, 
there has been a substantial growth in the proportion of graduates who are 
overqualified for their jobs. Moreover, successive age cohorts entering employment 
have been experiencing greater overqualification. Among women graduates a large 
rise in the incidence of overqualification, from 23% to 32%, took place between 2001 
and 2006. 
The growth in overqualification has mainly been in the form of “Formal 
Overqualification”, wherein employees reported that they are in below-graduate level 
jobs but nevertheless do not report that they are underutilising their skills. By 2006, 
this group comprised 23% of graduates. On average this group suffered an hourly pay 
penalty in 2006 of 0.32 log points (men) or 0.40 log points (women), but was not less 
satisfied with their jobs than matched graduates, even though the Formally 
Overqualified jobs were lower skilled than graduate jobs along a number of 
dimensions.  
By contrast, there has been little or no growth in the proportions of those who report 
that they are both overqualified and underutilising their skills: this latter group (“Real 
Overqualification”) still comprised less than one in ten graduates in 2006. The 
distinction between types is relevant because employees in the Real Overqualification 
group experienced greater, and more sharply rising, pay penalties than those in the 
Formal Overqualification group. By 2006 the estimated hourly pay penalty in the Real 
Overqualified Group amounted to 0.62 log points (men) or 0.64 log points (women); 
and the members of this group were much less satisfied with their jobs than matched 
gradautes. Taking the above trends together it can be concluded that, whether because 
of the increasing prevalence or because of the increasing costs for each employee, the 
impact of overqualification of both types would appear to be increasing over the 
period.  
The rising importance of overqualification is associated closely with the other trend 
we report in this paper, namely an increasing dispersion in the returns to graduate 
education. When we control for graduates being matched to graduate jobs there is no 
significant increase in the dispersion of returns (men) or the increase is substantially 
lower (women); but there is a notable fanning out of the “average” returns (without 
controlling for job matching) at the 90th and 10th quantiles during the last decade, 
according to both the QLFS and the Skills Survey series. Overqualification is thus a 
potentially fruitful way of describing and understanding such trends – in particular, 
one can see how the median quantile and OLS returns to graduate education can 
remain quite stable, while those in the lower quantiles experience declining returns 
because they contain rising proportions of overqualified workers who are 
experiencing greater pay penalties. 
These findings do not imply that we are here empirically distinguishing between the 
pure human capital model of graduate pay and alternative models that bring in 
demand-side characteristics. It has been shown (and we have provided additional 
descriptive evidence in this paper) that some overqualification is itself related to lower 
ability (Green et al., 2002). For example, those with higher Maths achievements, and 
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with higher class degrees, are ceteris paribus less likely to become overqualified. 
Overqualification also differs across degree subjects, and at least part of the cost of 
overqualification may be attributable to mismatches in particular subjects. 
Nevertheless, studies of the determinants of overqualification as a personal outcome, 
even when ability measures are included, also find a role for personal mobility 
constraints, and leave much variation that is unexplained (which could be attributable 
either to luck or, as in human capital theory, to unobserved ability). Our point is that, 
whatever the reason for overqualification, be it variable unobserved ability among 
graduates, market or structural rigidities, or temporary disequilibria, the idea of 
overqualification provides a tool for understanding the increasingly heterogeneous 
outcomes for graduates. It suggests that there remains some considerable value in 
continuing to track the prevalence, determinants and effects of overqualification. 
To what extent do increasing dispersion of the college wage premium and rising 
overqualification matter? We conclude briefly with three observations concerning the 
implications of our findings for educational policy. 
First, other writers have held that overqualification (and/or falling returns) implies 
that educational expansion by governments should be halted or reversed.11 We find 
that this argument is not defensible. It is sometimes forgotten that state intervention 
should be premised upon the social rate of return and its difference from the private 
return. The social returns to graduate education in Britain, in the case of those who are 
privately overqualified, are unknown, but may be substantial. Adding to them the 
non-pecuniary private returns, and recalling the need for forward-looking estimates, it 
becomes apparent that economists’ estimates of the historical pecuniary private 
returns to graduate education are never more than one part of the evidence required to 
form a scientific policy judgement. In general, the mere presence of overqualification 
does not imply that there are too many skills being supplied (Green and McIntosh, 
2007). An excess of skill could easily be deemed optimal if it induces skill-upgrading 
or skill-biased technological change (Acemoglu, 1998). Moreover, only a relatively 
small and as yet non-increasing proportion of graduates are both overqualified and 
under-utilising skills, with attendant consequences for job dissatisfaction. The 
importance in the aggregate of disappointed expectations may therefore have been 
exaggerated (Brown and Hesketh, 2004). Even should intervention to reduce 
overqualification be deemed advisable, policies to raise employers’ demands for skill 
are arguably the appropriate response in the context of rising global competition. 
Second, a plausible implication of rising dispersion and overqualification is that 
current and future cohorts of school leavers may perceive an increased risk of 
investing in higher education. Risk is also derived from uncertain course completion 
rates, but it is likely that the increased earnings dispersion will raise the perceived 
financial risks. If so, there would be expected to be some downward pressure on 
enrolments (Charles and Luoh, 2003). It may, therefore, be increasingly difficult for 
government to achieve targets for greater higher education participation if employees 
perceive the risks to be greater than other alternatives. 
Finally, increased dispersion suggests there is a need for transparency and improved 
information available to young people making their choices about educational 
investments. Choosing courses with low pecuniary returns is potentially rational and 
                                                 
11 Gray and Chapman (1999), for example , infer from the presence of overqualification that 
educational expenditures designed to reduce inequalities are wasted if the resulting skills are 
underutilised. 
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can suit the life-style choices of many. A problem arises only if young people are led 
to expect higher pecuniary returns than they subsequently will experience. Diversity 
in the returns is to some extent foreseeable, given the available knowledge. 
Information on returns is costly for young people to acquire (and especially beneficial 
when returns are changing), yet relatively inexpensive for the state to disseminate. 
There is a case for improved state provision of such information as a public good. 
Since forward-looking information needs to be based on the latest evidence in a 
changing labour market, the annual publication of returns estimates, including their 
dispersion, should become a regular part of the state’s contribution to aid private 
education choices. Since the data are already collected, the expenses for the state 
comprise only the computation and publication costs. We propose that publishing 
estimates of returns, obtained using open conventional methods, should become part 
of the remit of the UK’s Office for National Statistics.  
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Table A1  
 
Quantile Regression for NVQ Level 4+, Men 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LFS year  |                          Percentile                           
group     |  10th   20th   30th   40th   50th   60th   70th   80th   90th 
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
    94-96 | 0.332  0.353  0.370  0.353  0.332  0.328  0.315  0.275  0.275 
          | 0.017  0.011  0.010  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.009  0.011  0.014 
          |  
    97-00 | 0.346  0.394  0.409  0.410  0.397  0.394  0.383  0.379  0.381 
          | 0.012  0.009  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.008  0.009  0.012 
          |  
    01-03 | 0.323  0.384  0.413  0.411  0.409  0.402  0.395  0.392  0.380 
          | 0.012  0.011  0.009  0.009  0.010  0.009  0.010  0.010  0.013 
          |  
    04-06 | 0.314  0.370  0.400  0.419  0.411  0.411  0.409  0.412  0.426 
          | 0.013  0.011  0.011  0.010  0.010  0.010  0.011  0.013  0.015 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 
Quantile Regression for NVQ Level 4+, Women 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
LFS year  |                          Percentile                           
group     |  10th   20th   30th   40th   50th   60th   70th   80th   90th 
----------+-------------------------------------------------------------- 
    94-96 | 0.333  0.411  0.464  0.496  0.509  0.513  0.516  0.511  0.500 
          | 0.011  0.009  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.013 
          |  
    97-00 | 0.295  0.402  0.454  0.486  0.514  0.526  0.525  0.521  0.495 
          | 0.009  0.007  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.006  0.009 
          |  
    01-03 | 0.271  0.376  0.437  0.480  0.516  0.533  0.548  0.544  0.531 
          | 0.010  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.007  0.009  0.010 
          |  
    04-06 | 0.274  0.367  0.445  0.493  0.529  0.544  0.558  0.551  0.539 
          | 0.009  0.007  0.007  0.006  0.007  0.008  0.007  0.009  0.012 
------------------------------------------------------------------------- 


















1992: 90 0.440 0.050 0.460 0.059 
1992: 50 0.347 0.049 0.425 0.040 
1992: 10 0.389 0.037 0.493 0.042 
1997: 90 0.450 0.045 0.477 0.071 
1997: 50 0.375 0.037 0.443 0.035 
1997: 10 0.323 0.037 0.437 0.030 
2001: 90 0.488 0.055 0.512 0.053 
2001: 50 0.453 0.040 0.517 0.041 
2001: 10 0.348 0.042 0.488 0.050 
2006: 90 0.520 0.050 0.581 0.040 
2006: 50 0.445 0.033 0.564 0.045 















1992: 90 0.489 0.056 0.542 0.061 
1992: 50 0.391 0.025 0.474 0.032 
1992: 10 0.284 0.033 0.369 0.041 
1997: 90 0.558 0.041 0.567 0.056 
1997: 50 0.541 0.033 0.595 0.041 
1997: 10 0.484 0.035 0.562 0.068 
2001: 90 0.561 0.046 0.625 0.059 
2001: 50 0.533 0.023 0.623 0.029 
2001: 10 0.308 0.032 0.562 0.031 
2006: 90 0.717 0.017 0.772 0.023 
2006: 50 0.561 0.013 0.685 0.017 
2006: 10 0.269 0.016 0.531 0.012 
 
Source: Skills Survey series. All quantile regressions also include lower educational levels 
and matches to jobs, a quadratic in work experience, and industry and regional dummies; the 
omitted category is “no qualifications matched to a job requiring no qualifications”. 
“Average” means not conditioning for whether or not the employee is overqualified. 
“Matched” means conditioning on being employed in a graduate job. 
Returns are relative to level 2 (GCSE Grades A-C or equivalent). 
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